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This paper explores time variation in the dynamic effects of technology shocks on U.S. 
output, prices, interest rates as well as real and nominal wages. The results indicate 
considerable time variation in U.S. wage dynamics that can be linked to the monetary policy 
regime. Before and after the "Great Inflation", nominal wages moved in the same direction as 
the (required) adjustment of real wages, and in the opposite direction of the price response. 
During the "Great Inflation", technology shocks in contrast triggered wage-price spirals, 
moving nominal wages and prices in the same direction at longer horizons, thus counteracting 
the required adjustment of real wages, amplifying the ultimate repercussions on prices and 
hence increasing inflation volatility. Using a standard DSGE model, we show that these 
stylized facts, in particular the estimated magnitudes, can only be explained by assuming a 
high degree of wage indexation in conjunction with a weak reaction of monetary policy to 
inflation during the "Great Inflation", and low indexation together with aggressive inflation 
stabilization of monetary policy before and after this period. This means that the monetary 
policy regime is not only captured by the parameters of the monetary policy rule, but 
importantly also by the degree of wage indexation and resultant second round effects in the 
labor market. Accordingly, the degree of wage indexation is not structural in the sense of 
Lucas (1976). 
JEL-Code: C32, E24, E31, E42, E52. 
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A growing literature has been investigating the underlying driving forces of the “Great
Inﬂation” of the 1970s and the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility since the
mid 1980s. Several studies, e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Gali, López-Salido
and Vallés (2003) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) argue that a shift in systematic
monetary policy can explain these phenomena. More speciﬁcally, monetary policy has been
found to have overstabilized output at the cost of generating excessive inﬂation variability
in the 1970s, and became more aggressive with respect to inﬂation when Paul Volcker
became Fed chairman. However, a number of other studies conclude that the shift in the
systematic component of monetary policy is insuﬃcient or unable to explain the observed
changed macroeconomic volatility over time. Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006) and
Canova and Gambetti (2006) conduct counterfactual simulations with alternate monetary
policy rules and ﬁnd limited consequences of changes in the policy rule parameters for the
dynamics and variability of output and inﬂation across the regimes.1
The parameters of the policy rule may however not adequately capture the wider
macroeconomic implications of a change in the monetary policy regime. Indeed, there is a
widely held perception among policymakers that the incidence of so-called second-round
eﬀects , i.e. the ampliﬁcation of supply side shocks via mutually reinforcing feedback
eﬀects between wages and prices arising from explicit or implicit indexation, ultimately
depend on the monetary policy regime (e.g. Bernanke 2004). More speciﬁcally, second
round eﬀects are perceived to have been signiﬁcant as a result of unanchored inﬂation
expectations and widespread indexation during the "Great Inﬂation" and to have vanished
with the ﬁrm anchoring of inﬂation expectations in the subsequent era of price stability.
This reasoning essentially reﬂects the Lucas (1976) critique that a change in the policy
regime could have wider eﬀects on empirical macroeconomic regularities, in this case on the
prevalence of indexation practices in wage setting. These wider potential eﬀects of a change
1 Instead, they attribute the reduction in volatility to a changed variance of structural shocks aﬀecting
the economy. Also Stock and Watson (2002) and Gambetti, Canova and Pappa (2008) ﬁnd support for the
alternative "Good luck" hypothesis as the main explanation for greater macroeconomic stability in more
recent periods. On the other hand, Benati and Surico (2009) demonstrate that the impact of a change
in the systematic component of monetary policy may very well be identiﬁed as changes in the innovation
variances of other variables in these studies.
2in the monetary policy regime are obviously not captured by the policy rule parameters
alone. While the link between indexation of prices, as reﬂected in the degree of inﬂation
persistence, and the monetary policy regime has recently been explored and established
(Benati 2008), the link between wage indexation and the monetary policy regime and its
wider implications for macroeconomic dynamics have so far remained unexplored.2 This
is all the more surprising given the important role of wage indexation in the contemporary
literature on the causes of the "Great Inﬂation" (e.g. Fischer 1983; Bruno and Sachs
1985).
There is in fact institutional evidence supporting the conjecture that wage indexation
has not been constant over time and could be linked to the inﬂation regime. Consider
Figure 1, which shows the coverage of private sector workers by cost-of-living adjustment
(COLA) clauses.3 The chart reveals that, from the late 1960s onwards, COLA coverage
steadily increased to levels around 60% in the mid 1980s, after which there was again a
decline towards 20% in the mid 1990s, when the reporting of COLA coverage has been
discontinued. Interestingly, as also shown in the ﬁgure, we observe a substantial increase
in inﬂation volatility and the correlation between price and wage inﬂation during the
same period, suggesting that there is an interplay between the inﬂation regime, wage
indexation and possibly second-round eﬀects. A signiﬁcant positive impact of inﬂation
and inﬂation uncertainty on the prevalence of COLA clauses included in major collective
wage bargaining agreements has also been found by Holland (1986, 1995) and Ragan and
Bratsberg (2000).4 However, while these studies can establish a link between the inﬂation
2 Blanchard and Gali (2008) show that improved monetary policy credibility could have contributed to
more muted output and inﬂationary eﬀects of oil shocks since the mid 1980s, but do not provide evidence
for this hypothesis. Peersman and Van Robays (2009) ﬁnd no second-round eﬀects in the U.S. after oil
shocks, but focus only on the post-1985 period. A notably exception is a recent study by Blanchard and
Riggi (2009) who document vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of monetary
policy as a source for the lower impact of oil price shocks over time. Kilian (2009) and Baumeister and
Peersman (2008), however, show that oil price shocks cannot be compared over time due to structural
changes in the oil market.
3 COLA coverage obviously only measures explicit wage indexation in major wage agreements for
unionized workers and does therefore not capture explicit wage indexation in other wage agreements or
implicit wage indexation. However, Holland (1988) shows that COLA coverage is positively related to the
responsiveness of union, non-union and economy-wide wage aggregates to price level shocks and suggests,
b a s e do nt h i sﬁnding, that COLA coverage is a suitable proxy for the overall prevalence of explicit and
implicit wage indexation in the U.S. economy.
4 Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1984) show in an eﬃcient contract model with risk averse workers that
3regime and explicit indexation in collective bargaining agreements, they do not asses the
implications of this link for macroeconomic dynamics and volatility.
This paper aims to ﬁll this gap by inspecting time variation in U.S. wage dynamics
in response to technology shocks and its interrelation with the prevailing monetary policy
regime as well as with the dynamic responses of other key macro variables over the period
1957-2008. To this end we start by estimating an otherwise standard time-varying parame-
ters bayesian structural vector autoregression (TVP-BVAR) model including, besides the
usual set of macro variables, aggregate nominal wages. The results reveal some striking
and new stylized facts. First, the estimation of the reduced form VAR already supports
the idea of time variation in wage indexation. Whereas lagged price inﬂation had a sig-
niﬁcant impact on wage inﬂation until the early 1980s, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
afterwards. Second, when we consider the dynamic eﬀects of technology shocks over time,
we ﬁnd that before and after the high inﬂation regime of the 1970s, nominal wages adjust
in a way that supports the required adjustment of real wages (i.e. both variables increase
after a positive technology shock, while the price level declines and output rises perma-
nently) and that the long-run eﬀect of the shock on the price level is relatively mild. In
contrast, whereas the immediate response of nominal wages to a technology shock during
the "Great Inﬂation" is not very diﬀerent from the two other historical episodes, i.e. in-
versely related to the price response, nominal wages move in the same direction as prices at
longer horizons after the shock, thus counteracting the required adjustment of real wages
(i.e. nominal wages fall after a positive technology shock) and considerably amplifying
the ultimate repercussions of the shock on inﬂation. This pattern of time variation in the
nominal wage response across the three inﬂa t i o nr e g i m e sc o v e r e db yo u ra n a l y s i sh e n c e
supports the notion that the incidence of second-round eﬀects and, as a consequence, the
occurrence of wage-price spirals in response to supply side shocks and accompanying in-
ﬂation variability can be linked to the monetary policy regime. This hypothesis is further
supported by examining real wage adjustment over time. The incidence of second-round
eﬀects and strong wage indexation should also result in more real wage rigidity after a
technology shock, which is exactly what we ﬁnd for the "Great Inﬂation" period.
the higher inﬂation uncertainty is, the greater is the likelihood of indexation.
4We then continue our analysis by investigating the role of the monetary policy rule
and the degree of wage indexation in explaining the above-described stylized facts using
a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The results of model-
based simulations suggest that variations over time in both the policy rule parameters and
the degree of wage indexation simultaneously are needed in order to match the stylized
facts established by the empirical analysis. To be more speciﬁc, the simulations reveal
that a policy rule with an aggressive response to inﬂation together with a very low degree
of wage indexation can reproduce the reaction patterns of nominal wages and prices to
a technology shock found for the episodes before and after the "Great Inﬂation", i.e. an
increase of nominal wages supporting the required increase in real wages, while prices fall.
Altering the policy rule towards very poor inﬂation stabilization can reproduce a positive
co-movement of the long-run response of nominal wages and prices to a technology shock,
but totally fails to generate the magnitudes of the eﬀects in the 1970s. These magnitudes
can only be matched with a combination of a weakly inﬂation stabilizing monetary policy
rule and considerable wage indexation. On the other hand, when we consider a model
with only a high degree of wage indexation, together with a strongly inﬂation stabilizing
policy rule, the simulations can reproduce neither the magnitudes of the impulse responses
in the 1970s, nor those in the preceding and subsequent periods. This ﬁnding supports
a point made by Fischer (1983), who shows in a simple macroeconomic model that the
association between all aspects of indexation and inﬂation depends on the monetary and
ﬁscal policies being followed by the government.
Accordingly, only the combination of changes in both the policy rule and wage index-
ation simultaneously can explain the variation of the conditional volatility of price and
wage inﬂation after technology shocks over time, suggesting that time variation in the
parameters of a central bank reaction function and the degree of wage indexation in the
U.S. were two sides of the same coin, i.e. the monetary policy regime. A weakly inﬂa-
tion stabilizing policy rule is conducive to high and volatile inﬂation. This fosters the
use of wage indexation clauses as protection against inﬂation uncertainty, which in turn
contributes to inﬂation uncertainty by amplifying the eﬀects of inﬂationary shocks. On
the other hand, a regime of price stability requires a strong inﬂation stabilizing policy rule
5and reduces the need for protection against inﬂation uncertainty, thus mitigating wage
indexation. A lower degree of wage indexation in turn reduces the eﬀect of inﬂationary
shocks, thus further contributing to price stability. Hence, counterfactual experiments
in the context of the "Great Inﬂation" and "Great Moderation" literature should take
both features of the monetary policy regime into account. Furthermore, our ﬁnding that
labor market dynamics and particularly the existence of second-round eﬀects via wages
are likely to be dependent on the policy regime also implies that hard-wiring a certain
degree of wage indexation in macro models like the ones of Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007) is potentially misleading when changes in the
monetary policy regime are analyzed. In particular, the degree of wage indexation is not
structural in the sense of Lucas (1976), a point which is also made and shown by Benati
(2008) for inﬂation persistence.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present
the empirical evidence on time variation in U.S. wage dynamics. We ﬁrst discuss the
methodology and some reduced form evidence on possible wage indexation, before we
report the results of the estimated eﬀects of technology shocks over time. In section 3,
we propose a standard DSGE model to evaluate the role of the monetary policy rule and
the degree of indexation in explaining the estimated time variation. Finally, section 4
concludes.
2 Time variation in wage dynamics - empirical evidence
2.1 A Bayesian VAR with time-varying parameters
To estimate the impact of technology shocks on wage and inﬂation dynamics, we use
aV A R (p) model with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility in the spirit of
Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005), Primiceri (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007). We
consider the following reduced form representation:
yt = ct + B1,tyt−1 + ... + Bp,tyt−p + ut ≡ X0
tθt + ut (1)
6where yt is a vector of observed endogenous variables, i.e. output (real GDP), prices (GDP
deﬂator), nominal wages (hourly compensation in the non-farm business sector) and the
interest rate (three-months Treasury bill rate).5 All variables are transformed to non-
annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rates by taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the natural
logarithm, except the interest rate which remains in levels. The overall sample covers the
period 1947Q1-2008Q1, but the ﬁrst ten years of data are used as a training sample to
generate the priors for the actual sample period. The lag length of the VAR is set to p =2
which is suﬃcient to capture the dynamics in the system. The time-varying intercepts and
lagged coeﬃcients are stacked in θt to obtain the state-space representation of the model.
The ut of the observation equation are heteroskedastic disturbance terms with zero mean
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Let αt be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At (stacked by rows)
and ht be the vector containing the diagonal elements of Ht. Following Primiceri (2005),
the three driving processes of the system are postulated to evolve as follows:
θt = θt−1 + νt νt ∼ N (0,Q) (3)
αt = αt−1 + ζt ζt ∼ N(0,S) (4)
lnhi,t =l n hi,t−1 + σiηi,t ηi,t ∼ N(0,1) (5)
The time-varying parameters θt and αt are modeled as driftless random walks. The
elements of the vector of volatilities ht =[ h1,t,h 2,t,h 3,t,h 4,t]
0 are assumed to evolve as
geometric random walks independent of each other. The error terms of the three transition
5 The data series were taken from the St. Louis FRED database.
7equations are independent of each other and of the innovations of the observation equation.
In addition, we impose a block-diagonal structure for S of the following form:
























so that the covariance states can
b ee s t i m a t e de q u a t i o nb ye q u a t i o n .
We estimate the above model using Bayesian methods (Markov Chain Monte Carlo al-
gorithm). The priors for the initial states of the regression coeﬃcients, the covariances and
the log volatilities are assumed to be normally distributed, independent of each other and
independent of the hyperparameters. Particularly, the priors are calibrated on the point
estimates of a constant-coeﬃcient VAR estimated over the training sample period. The
posterior distribution is simulated by sequentially drawing from the conditional posterior
of four blocks of parameters: the coeﬃcients, the simultaneous relations, the variances and
the hyperparameters. For further details of the implementation and MCMC algorithm,
we refer to Primiceri (2005), Benati and Mumtaz (2007) and Baumeister and Peersman
(2008). We perform 50,000 iterations of the Bayesian Gibbs sampler but keep only every
10th draw in order to mitigate the autocorrelation among the draws. After a "burn-in"
period of 50,000 iterations, the sequence of draws of the four blocks from their respective
conditional posteriors converges to a sample from the joint posterior distribution. We
ascertain that our chain has converged to the ergodic distribution by performing the usual
set of convergence tests (see Primiceri 2005; Benati and Mumtaz 2007). In total, we collect
5000 simulated values from the Gibbs chain on which we base our structural analysis.
2.2 Wage indexation over time - some reduced form evidence
To have a ﬁrst impression about time variation in wage indexation, Figure 2 reports at
each point in time the median, 16th and 84th percentiles of the long-run multiplier eﬀect
of lagged price inﬂation on wage inﬂation, obtained from the posterior of the reduced form
8VAR. Some caution is required when interpreting the results since these ﬁgures do not
capture indexation within the quarter, that is only lagged indexation eﬀects are captured.
However, given the fact that wages are mostly adjusted with some lag, the ﬁgures should
give at least some indication of possible time variation in wage indexation to past inﬂation
rates.6 They can also be interpreted as a causality test. From the next subsection onwards,
when we identify structural innovations, also immediate eﬀects will be taken into account.
The charts illustrate already a lot of time variation that is consistent with the con-
jecture that wage indexation could be linked to the monetary policy regime. Speciﬁcally,
Figure 2 shows that the impact of lagged price inﬂation on wage inﬂation was relatively
high at the beginning of our sample period, after which we observe a decline to an insigniﬁ-
cant impact in the mid 1960s. From the mid 1960s onwards, however, we ﬁnd an increased
and signiﬁcant impact of lagged inﬂation until the early 1980s, after which the sum of the
coeﬃcients became again insigniﬁcant up until today. This pattern matches more or less
the time variation in COLA coverage shown in Figure 1. The estimates also conﬁrm a
causal eﬀect from prices on wages during the "Great Inﬂation", which is a precondition
for triggering wage-price spirals.
2.3 Impact of technology shocks - stylized facts
We next analyze wage and price dynamics in a more structural manner by focusing on the
dynamic eﬀects of technological innovations. Technological disturbances are particularly
interesting for the examination of time variation of possible second-round eﬀects since they
should move prices and wages in opposite directions, unless this is prevented by strong
wage indexation. More speciﬁcally, in contrast to monetary policy or other demand-side
shocks, labor supply or wage mark-up shocks, a favorable technology shock is expected
to generate a positive eﬀect on (real) wages, while prices should decline. In section 2.3.1,
we brieﬂyd i s c u s st h ei d e n t i ﬁcation strategy which we borrow from Peersman and Straub
(2009), and the estimation results are presented in section 2.3.2.
6 Note that in standard DSGE models, wages are always indexed to past inﬂation rates. Notice also
that prices can predict wages due to the structure of the economy, which is not necessarily via indexation.
92.3.1 Identiﬁcation
For the identiﬁcation of technology shocks in a structural VAR, Peersman and Straub
(2009) derive a set of sign restrictions that are consistent with a large class of DSGE
models and robust for parameter uncertainty. Peersman and Straub (2009) use this sign
restrictions model-based identiﬁcation strategy to estimate the impact of technology shocks
on hours worked and employment. We impose the same restrictions in the above described
VAR with time-varying parameters.7 Speciﬁcally, positive technology shocks are identiﬁed
as shocks with a non-negative eﬀect on output and real wages and non-positive eﬀects
on prices. These restrictions, which are imposed the ﬁrst four quarters after the shock,
are suﬃcient to uniquely disentangle the innovations from monetary policy, aggregate
demand and labor market disturbances. In particular, expansionary monetary policy and
other aggregate demand shocks are expected to have a positive eﬀect on prices, while
expansionary labor market innovations such as labor supply or wage mark-up shocks are
typically characterized by a fall in real wages.8 Notice that the nominal wage response to
a technology shock is left unconstrained at all horizons. Note also that, while the shock
is labelled as a technology shock, it could still comprise other supply-side shocks such
as commodity price or price mark-up shocks. In the context of our analysis, however, a
further decomposition is not required.
2.3.2 Results
Figure 3 displays the median impulse responses of real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, the nomi-
nal interest rate, real and nominal wages to a one standard deviation technology shock for
7 Peersman and Straub (2009) propose this identiﬁcation strategy with sign restrictions as an alternative
to Gali’s (1999) long-run restrictions. The latter, however, cannot be implemented in our time-varying
SVAR. To keep the number of variables manageable, we do not have hours worked or labor productivity
as one of the variables in the model. The approach of Peersman and Straub (2009) does instead not need
these variables for identiﬁcation purposes. Imposing long-run neutrality of non-technological disturbances
in a model where the underlying structure and dynamics change over time is also something diﬃcult to
implement without making additional assumptions. See also Dedola and Neri (2007) for a similar sign
restrictions approach.
8As a robustness check we reestimated the VAR with the full set of shocks identiﬁed simultaneously
(i.e. monetary policy, aggregate demand, labour market as well as technology shocks) and found that the
results for the technology shocks were not aﬀected. Hence, we only report the results for the single-shock
identiﬁcation scheme. The results of the estimation with the full set of shocks identiﬁed are available upon
request.
10horizons up to 28 quarters at each point in time spanning the period 1957Q1 to 2008Q1.
The estimated responses have been accumulated and are shown in levels.9 The responses
reveal that there is considerable time variation in the dynamic eﬀects of technology shocks.
This is demonstrated even more clearly in Figure 4, where the time-varying median re-
sponses of output, real wages, prices and nominal wages are plotted respectively 0 and
28 quarters after the shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior
distribution. Since it is not possible to uniquely identify the innovation variances of the
structural shocks, it is also not possible to exactly pin-down to which extent the time
variation is due to changes in the sizes of the shocks or in the way they are transmitted
to the economy.10 However, by carefully examining how the trends and correlations be-
tween impulse responses have evolved over time, it is still possible to come up with some
meaningful interpretations.
A ﬁr s tr e s u l tt h a te m e r g e sf r o mt h ei n s p e c t ion of the impulse responses is a weaker
impact of an average technology shock on economic activity since the early 1980s, a break
date which coincides with the start of the "Great Moderation". In contrast to this, there
is no evidence of a reduced eﬀect of technology shocks on real wages. The short-run eﬀect
is even found to have slightly increased over time, while the long-run eﬀect has remained
at the elevated levels reached in the early 1970s. This result is in line with recent micro
evidence reported by Davis and Kahn (2008), who document that the "Great Moderation"
was not associated with a reduction in household income volatility. The most striking time-
9 Impulse response functions are computed as the diﬀerence between two conditional expectations with
and without the exogenous shock:
IRFt+k = E [yt+k | εt,ω t] − E [yt+k | ωt]
where yt+k contains the forecasts of the endogenous variables at horizon k, ωt represents the current
information set and εt is the current disturbance term. At each point in time the information set we
condition upon contains the actual values of the lagged endogenous variables and a random draw of the
model parameters and hyperparameters. In the ﬁgures, we show the median impulse responses for each
quarter based on 500 draws. The impulse response function of the real wage for each draw is obtained via
the response of the nominal wage rate and the GDP deﬂator.
10 This is a well-known problem when VAR results are compared across diﬀerent samples. Only the
impact of an "average" shock on a number of variables can be measured. Consequently, it is not possible
to know exactly whether the magnitude of an average shock has changed or the reaction of the economy
(economic structure) to this shock, unless an arbitrary normalization on one of the variables is done (e.g.
Gambetti, Pappa and Canova 2006 normalize on output or prices). See also Baumeister and Peersman
(2008) on this problem in the context of oil supply shocks.
11variation however is a substantial stronger long-run impact of an average technology shock
on prices and nominal wages between the end of the 1960s and the early 1980s, i.e. during
the "Great Inﬂation" period, compared to the preceding and subsequent periods.
Gali, López-Salido and Vallés (2003) already detected a much stronger impact of a tech-
n o l o g ys h o c ko ni n ﬂation in the pre-Volcker period (54Q1-79Q2) relative to the Volcker-
Greenspan era (82Q3-98Q3). Given the more muted inﬂationary consequences we also
ﬁnd for the period before the start of the "Great Inﬂation", our results indicate that the
ﬁrst period they consider actually also covers two diﬀerent regimes.
The sign switch in the response of nominal wages to a technology shock at the start
and at the end of the "Great Inﬂation" is a stylized fact which has not been documented
before. As a matter of fact, the few studies that do analyze the impact of technology shocks
on wages using SVARs assuming constant parameters over the whole sample period, e.g.
Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) or Liu and Phaneuf (2007), conclude that there is only
a very weak negative or insigniﬁcant response of nominal wage inﬂation accompanying
as i g n i ﬁcant rise in real wages. The present analysis suggests that these ﬁndings are
misleading since they are ignoring considerable time variation in the reaction pattern of
wages. Before and after the high inﬂation regime of the 1970s, nominal wages adjusted
to technology shocks in a way that supported the required adjustment of real wages.
During the "Great Inﬂation", in contrast, nominal wages moved in the same direction as
prices after the supply-side shock, thus even counteracting the required adjustment of real
wages. Interestingly, this is not the case for the contemporaneous impact. As can be seen
from Figure 4, the immediate response of nominal wages has always been positive after a
favorable technology shock, and even of a similar magnitude. Only after a few quarters,
there is a sign switch in the nominal wage reaction. The latter is more clearly visible in
Figure 5, which shows the pass-through of a technology shock to output, prices, interest
rates as well as real and nominal wages at three points in time: before (1960Q1), during
(1974Q1) and after (2000Q1) the "Great Inﬂation".
Another interesting result of the analysis is the time variation in the adjustment speed
of prices, real and nominal wages. As illustrated in Figure 5, adjustment patterns of these
variables look very similar for the periods before and after the "Great Inﬂation", where
12we ﬁnd an immediate adjustment of prices, nominal and especially real wages to their new
equilibrium values. In contrast, the adjustment of real wages is very sluggish in the 1970s.
This result points to a high degree of real wage rigidity following permanent technology
shocks in this period, with an estimated half-life of the overall real wage adjustment of
approximately one year (and even more).11
3 Explaining the stylized facts
3.1 Interpretation of the evidence
It appears implausible that only changes in the size of technology shocks are driving the
pattern of the responses of prices and nominal wages over time. If this were the case, then
we should see the same pattern of time variation in the impulse responses of the other
variables, which is not the case. Although we cannot pin-down the exact magnitude of the
shocks, the long-run (permanent) eﬀects on output suggest that technology shocks could
have been bigger in the 1970s (see Figure 4).12 However, when we consider the long-run
eﬀects on real wages, a variable which is also expected to be closely related to productivity
changes, the impact was not even stronger in the 1970s relative to more recent periods.
The time variation of the output eﬀects is also much more subdued than the time variation
of the impact on nominal wages and prices. Furthermore, a diﬀerent size of the underlying
shocks over time cannot explain why the contemporaneous impact on nominal wages has
always been positive (and of a similar magnitude), whereas the long-run eﬀects became
negative at the start of the "Great Inﬂation" and changed back to positive at the end of
this episode in the early 1980s. This sign switch in the reaction of nominal wages clearly
points to a structural change in the labor market.
A plausible explanation for the changing pattern in the responses of prices and nominal
wages is that second-round eﬀects via wage indexation played an important role during
the "Great Inﬂation" so that technology disturbances during that period simultaneously
11 The conclusions are not altered if we select alternative quarters in each period. The half life is
calculated for each draw of the posterior independently.
12 Note that this ﬁnding is not at odds with the "bad luck" hypothesis contributing to the "Great
Inﬂation".
13triggered wage-price spirals giving rise to larger long-run eﬀects of such shocks on wages
and prices, and hence increased inﬂation variability.13 This hypothesis can also perfectly
explain the sign switch in the nominal wage response during the 1970s. Consider an
unfavorable technology shock. Whereas this shock has a downward impact on real wages,
also nominal wages tend to decline in the very short-run. The accompanying rise in prices,
however, generates a positive eﬀect on nominal wages due to the second-round eﬀects,
triggering a wage-price spiral resulting in a sign switch of the nominal wage response and
a positive long-run co-movement between prices and wages. Furthermore, a high level of
wage indexation is also consistent with the sluggish adjustment of real wages following a
technology shock that we found for the 1970s. In particular, a strong link between price
and wage dynamics due to explicit or implicit wage indexation hinders a fast adjustment
of the real wage, which is the ratio of the two, to its new equilibrium.
The existence of second-round eﬀects via rising wages could be the consequence of ex-
plicit or implicit wage indexation schemes. As we have shown in Figure 1, the prevalence
of cost-of-living adjustment clauses in collective bargaining agreements increased consid-
erably during the 1970s, peaked in the late 1970s, and declined again afterwards. This
pattern ﬁts very well with the estimated time variation in wage dynamics. A detailed
analysis of the determinants of wage indexation is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
existing literature refers particularly to the role of inﬂation uncertainty as the most impor-
tant determinant.14 The latter, however, corroborates very well with the "bad monetary
policy" hypothesis of the "Great Inﬂation". In particular, Gali, López-Salido and Vallés
(2003) ﬁnd the Fed’s response to a technology shock in the Volcker-Greenspan period to
be consistent with an optimal monetary policy rule. For the Pre-Volcker period, in con-
trast, the Fed tended to overstabilize output at the cost of generating excessive inﬂation
volatility. An insuﬃcient unconditional interest rate response to inﬂation before Volcker
became the Fed’s chairman has also been brought forward by Judd and Rudebusch (1999),
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005) among others.15
13 Note that when we identify additional shocks using the sign restrictions proposed by Peersman (2005),
a similar strong wage-price spiral in the 1970s shows up. These results are available upon request.
14 E.g. Holland (1986, 1995), Weiner (1986) or Ragan and Bratsberg (2000). Alternative reasons put
forward in this literature are changes in regulation, power of unions or competition.
15 Francis, Owyang and Theodorou (2005) ﬁnd that the type of monetary policy rule also contributes
14By conducting counterfactual simulations, a number of studies (e.g. Primiceri 2005;
Sims and Zha 2006; Canova and Gambetti 2006) conclude that this shift in the monetary
policy rule is unable to explain the changed macroeconomic dynamics and volatility over
time, hence questioning the monetary policy hypothesis. To the extent that improved
monetary policy has also provided a clear anchor for inﬂation expectations, contributing
to reduced inﬂation uncertainty, our analysis indicates that the additional eﬀects via lower
wage indexation and contained second-round eﬀects should also be taken into account.
What is striking, is that our results suggest that increased wage indexation itself in turn
leads to additional inﬂation variability via second-round eﬀects, thus further strengthening
the incentive to include cost-of-living adjustments in collective bargaining agreements. The
relevance of both features characterizing the monetary policy regime in explaining the time
variation in the reactions to a technology shock uncovered by our empirical analysis, and
in particular their interplay, is analyzed in more detail in the next subsection.
3.2 Dynamic eﬀects of technology shocks in a DSGE model
To explore the sources of time variation more carefully, we use a standard DSGE model
with Calvo sticky prices and wages, price and wage indexation, habit formation, and a
conventional Taylor rule. The model can be considered as a simpliﬁed version of Smets and
Wouters (2007) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Details of the model can be
found in the appendix. Since we focus on the role of changes in the monetary policy rule
and changes in wage indexation, we simulate the dynamics of a technology shock within
the model by varying the inﬂation reaction parameter in the monetary policy rule and the
degree of wage indexation. For all simulations, the other parameters of the model are set
at the following baseline values: the discount factor β =0 .99; the preference parameter
ζ =3 ; habit persistence b =0 .9; degree of monopolistic competition in respectively the
goods and labor market λp =6 , λw =1 0 ; Calvo price and wage parameters θp =0 .85,
θw =0 .85; degree of price indexation γp =0 .6;c o e ﬃcient on output in the monetary
to cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬀects of technology shocks. Bilbiie and Straub (2006) argue that
limited asset market participation before 1980 in the US (and the change thereof) is crucial in explaining
macroeconomic performance and monetary policy conduct.
15policy rule φy =0 .5; and interest rate smoothing ρr =0 .65.16 To match the empirical
set-up, we simulate the dynamic eﬀects of a permanent technology shock in the model by
imposing ρa =1 .
All results are reported in Figure 6. The ﬁrst column reports the simulated dynamic
eﬀects of a technology shock assuming a policy rule with a very weak reaction to inﬂation
and no wage indexation by setting φπ =1 .01 and γw =0 .0.17 As a benchmark to match the
stylized facts of the "Great Inﬂation", the graphs also show the estimated median impulse
responses for 1974Q1, together with 16th and 84 percentiles of the posterior. To match the
magnitude of a technology shock in the DSGE model, the VAR responses are normalized
t oa1p e r c e n tl o n g - r u ni n c r e a s eo ft h eo u t p u tl e v e l . T h es i m i l a r i t yo ft h es i m u l a t i o n s
and the estimated output and real wage responses is high. The contemporaneous reaction
of the interest rate is also the same as in the data, and we do ﬁnd a negative long-run
response of nominal wages. However, the simulated magnitudes of the eﬀects on prices
and wages are much smaller than in the data. Hence, a policy rule with weak inﬂation
stabilization alone cannot explain the stylized facts of technology shocks in the 1970s,
particularly not the wage dynamics and accompanying inﬂation variability.
In the second column of Figure 6, we augment the model with wage indexation by
setting γw =0 .65. A relative high degree of wage indexation is clearly crucial to explain
the estimated magnitudes of the eﬀects of technological innovations during the "Great
Inﬂation". More speciﬁcally, we now ﬁnd a substantial decline of nominal wages in the
long-run, counteracting the required adjustment of real wages and amplifying the ulti-
mate repercussions on prices. The inﬂationary eﬀects are almost double compared to a
16 The choices of the parameter values, e.g. Calvo parameters or habit persistence, are mainly determined
to capture the ’shapes’ of the estimated impulse responses. We also experimented with possible time
variation of price indexation or alternative parameters for output and interest rate smoothing in the policy
rule, but the results of these experiments do not aﬀect the conclusions, i.e. the consequences of varying
these parameters for price and wage dynamics are very limited. Accordingly, we can focus on the inﬂation
parameter in the policy rule and the degree of wage indexation. These other simulations are available upon
request.
17 We impose an inﬂation reaction parameter which is larger than 1 in order to avoid model indetermi-
nacy. We also simulated the model under indeterminacy using the mimum state variable approach (see
Lubik and Schorfheide 2004). The results of this exercise suggested that allowing for indeterminacy in this
way does not alter the conclusion of our analysis that a change in the inﬂation reaction parameter in the
policy rule alone cannot explain the time variation in U.S. wage and price inﬂation dynamics documented
in section 2.
16situation without wage indexation. The initial nominal wage response in the model is
even positive,consistent with what we found in the data. Hence, second-round eﬀects via
wage indexation must have been important in the 1970s, contributing to higher inﬂation
variability.
Interestingly, wage indexation alone can also not explain the stylized facts. In column
3, we report the results of a simulation assuming a policy rule with a strong reaction to
inﬂation (φπ =2 .8) combined with a high degree of wage indexation. Again, it is impos-
sible to match the estimated magnitudes from section 2, i.e. a weak inﬂation stabilizing
monetary policy rule is also needed to explain the stylized facts of the 1970s.
Why is the interaction of weak monetary policy response and wage indexation crucial
for reproducing the results? Note that in our model the parameter γw partially indexes
nominal wages to lagged price inﬂation for all those households that are not able to re-
optimize wages. Now if prices decline, as is the case following a permanent technology
shock, average wages decline more substantially with wage indexation than without. At
the same time a weak monetary policy response is amplifying the described eﬀect. Weak
monetary policy inﬂation reaction to inﬂation implies, ceteris paribus, that interest rates
fall less notably following a permanent technology shock. This results in a stronger decline
in inﬂation rates than under a rule that reacts aggressively to price developments. That is,
the interaction of high wage indexation and weak monetary response to inﬂation pushes
up the volatility of nominal variables in the model; a feature that is in line with the data
for the ’Great Inﬂation’ period.
That the interaction between policy rule parameter and wage indexation is crucial to
get the substantial inﬂationary repercussions of technology shocks can be illustrated with
a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation. Whereas the long-run impact of a technology
shock in the DSGE model on prices increases by 63% when the inﬂation reaction coeﬃcient
in the policy rule is reduced to a low level, and by 52% when only wage indexation is high,
combining both raises the ultimate eﬀects by 197%. This ﬁnding is consistent with Fischer
(1983) who shows in a simple theoretical model that the inﬂationary eﬀects of all aspects
of indexation depends on the monetary and ﬁscal policy followed by the government.
Is it possible to get the positive long-run response of nominal wages from the period
17before and after the "Great Inﬂation"? A shift in the monetary policy rule towards
aggressive inﬂation stabilization, while still assuming the presence of a relatively high
level of wage indexation, clearly cannot. The long-run impact on nominal wages is still
negative. Furthermore, such a shift in the policy rule alone can also not explain the
magnitude of the inﬂationary eﬀects of technological innovations in more recent periods.
This is illustrated for 2000Q1 in the fourth column of Figure 6.18 The simulated eﬀect
on inﬂation is now too strong. To get the positive response of nominal wages and more
plausible values for the magnitudes, the assumption of high wage indexation also has to
be abandoned. As can be seen from the last column of Figure 6, a policy rule with a
strong reaction to inﬂation together with low or no wage indexation is able to generate
magnitudes of impulse responses that are in line with the stylized facts.
In sum, only the combination of a policy rule with a low inﬂation reaction coeﬃcient
and a high degree of wage indexation can explain U.S. wage dynamics and inﬂation ﬂuc-
tuations following technology shocks during the "Great Inﬂation". On the other hand,
an aggressive policy rate response to inﬂation combined with very low wage indexation is
needed to explain wage dynamics and inﬂationary eﬀects before and after this period. As
we have argued, however, the degree of wage indexation and the existence of second-round
eﬀects is likely to be dependent on the monetary policy regime, and improved monetary
policy over time involves much more than only the monetary policy rule of the central
bank. In particular, both characteristics can be considered as two sides of the same coin,
namely monetary policy credibility, a feature which should be taken into account when
examining the implications of changes in the monetary policy regime.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the time-varying dynamic eﬀects of technology shocks on a set
of key U.S. macroeconomic variables using data spanning the period 1947 till 2008. The
focus of the analysis is on time variation in wage dynamics, which has so far remained
unexplored in the literature. We ﬁnd considerable time variation that can be linked to
18 Which is also the case for other quarters before and after the "Great Inﬂation".
18the monetary policy regime. More speciﬁcally, during the "Great Inﬂation", technology
shocks triggered second-round eﬀects via mutually reinforcing feedback eﬀects between
wages and prices, amplifying the ultimate eﬀects on prices and hence increasing inﬂation
variability. In contrast, before and after this period, nominal wages are found to move in
the same direction as the required adjustment of real wages and in the opposite direction
of the price response after technological innovations, contributing to a subdued impact on
inﬂation and inﬂation volatility.
Based on a standard DSGE model, we explore the explanations for these new stylized
facts. Model-based simulations suggest that variations over time in both the policy rule
parameters and the degree of wage indexation are needed in order to match the stylized
facts established by the empirical analysis. What is needed is the combination of a low
inﬂation reaction parameter in the policy rule and a high degree of wage indexation in the
"Great Inﬂation" period and the combination of a high inﬂation reaction parameters and
low wage indexation in the preceding and subsequent period. This implied simultaneous
time variation of the inﬂation reaction parameter in the policy rule and the degree of
wage indexation are two sides of the same coin, the monetary policy regime. A weakly
inﬂation stabilizing policy rule is conducive to high and volatile inﬂation. This fosters the
use of wage indexation clauses as protection against inﬂation uncertainty, which in turn
contributes to inﬂation uncertainty by amplifying the eﬀects of inﬂationary shocks. On
the other hand, a regime of price stability requires a strong inﬂation stabilizing policy rule
and reduces the need for protection against inﬂation uncertainty, thus mitigating wage
indexation. A lower degree of wage indexation in turn reduces the eﬀects of inﬂationary
shocks, thus further contributing to price stability.
The fact that the monetary policy regime is not only characterized by the parameters
of the monetary policy rule, but also by the wage setting behavior in the labor market,
has two important implications for policy analysis. First, counterfactual experiments by
altering solely the monetary policy rule, often done in the context of the "Great Moder-
ation" literature, do not adequately capture the wider consequences of a change in the
policy regime that are shown to be very important. Second, a certain degree of wage
indexation is typically embedded in micro-founded macroeconomic models, which could
19also be misleading when optimal monetary policy or signiﬁcant regime changes in policy
are analyzed. As pointed out by Benati (2008) in the context of inﬂation persistence, the
degree of wage indexation is also not structural in the sense of Lucas (1976).
20A Appendix - the DSGE model
A.1 Households
In the ﬁrst step we present the optimization problem of a representative household denoted
by h. The household maximizes lifetime utility by choosing consumption Ch,t and ﬁnancial













where β is the discount factor and ζ is the inverse of the elasticity of work eﬀort with
respect to the real wage. The external habit variable Ht is assumed to be proportional to
aggregate past consumption:
Ht = bCt−1 (8)
Household’s utility depends positively on the change in Ch,t, and negatively on hours










Nh,t + Dh,t + Th,t +
Bh,t
Pt
Here, Rt is the nominal interest rate, Wh,t is the nominal wage, Th,t are lump-sum taxes
paid to the ﬁscal authority, Pt is the price level and Dh,t is the dividend income. In the fol-
lowing we will assume the existence of state-contingent securities that are traded amongst
households in order to insure households against variations in household-speciﬁc wage
income. As a result where possible, we neglect the indexation of individual households.
The maximization of the objective function with respect to consumption, bond hold-











There are two types of ﬁrms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed
by f ∈ [0,1], each of which produces a single diﬀerentiated intermediate good, Yf,t,a n da
distinct set of perfectly competitive ﬁrms, which combine all the intermediate goods into
as i n g l eﬁnal good, Yt.
A.2.1 Final-Good Firms











where λp,t is a variable determining the degree of imperfect competition in the goods
market. Minimizing the cost of production subject to the aggregation constraint (11)
results in demand for the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods as a function of their price Pf,t



















Each intermediate-goods ﬁrm f produces its diﬀerentiated output using a production
function of a standard Cobb Douglas form:
Yf,t = AtNf,t (13)





Following Calvo (1983), intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms receive permission to opti-
mally reset their price in a given period t with probability 1 − θp.A l lﬁrms that receive
permission to reset their price choose the same price P∗
f,t.E a c hﬁrm f receiving permission









subject to the demand for its output (12) where χt,t+k is the stochastic discount factor of
the households owing the ﬁrm and
Df,t = Pf,tYf,t − MCtYf,t
are period-t nominal proﬁts which are distributed as dividends to the households.
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrm’s optimal price-setting



















With the intermediate-goods prices Pf,t set according to equation (14), the evolution
















There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive unions indexed over the same range
as the households, h ∈ [0,1], which act as wage setters for the diﬀerentiated labor services
supplied by the households taking the aggregate nominal wage rate Wt and aggregate labor
demand Nt as given. Following Calvo (1983), unions receive permission to optimally reset
their nominal wage rate in a given period t with probability 1−θw. All unions that receive
permission to reset their wage rate choose the same wage rate W∗
h,t. Each union h that
receives permission to optimally reset its wage rate in period t maximizes the household’s
lifetime utility function (7) subject to its intertemporal budget constraint (9) and the









where λw,t is a variable determining the degree of imperfect competition in the labor
market. As a result, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for the union’s optimal
















− (1 + λw) MRSt+k
¸
=0 (15)
where MRSt = N
ζ
h,t(Ct−Ht) stands for the marginal rate of substitution, and γw deter-
mines the degree of wage indexation. Aggregate labor demand, Nt, and the aggregate















With the labor-speciﬁc wage rates Wh,t set according to (15), the evolution of the aggregate















A.4 Market Clearing and Shock Process
The labor market is in equilibrium when the demand for the index of labor services by the
intermediate-goods ﬁr m se q u a l st h ed i ﬀerentiated labor services supplied by households at
the wage rates set by unions. Furthermore, the ﬁnal-good market is in equilibrium when
the supply by the ﬁnal-good ﬁrms equals the demand by households:
Yt = Ct
The model is simulated in its log-linearized form, i.e. small letters will characterize in
the following percentage deviations form the steady state. The exogenous shock process
follows an AR(1) described by the following equations:
at = ρaat−1 + ηa
t (16)
whereby we set ρa =1 , implying a random walk productivity shock which induces perma-
nent eﬀects. Finally, monetary policy follows a standard log-linearized Taylor rule:
rt = ρrrt−1 +( 1− ρr)(φy∆yt + φππt) (17)
where ρr is a parameter determining the degree of interest rate smoothing, while φy and
φπ represent the elasticity of the interest rate to output and inﬂation respectively.
25A.5 Equilibrium dynamics














(wt − at) (18)
πw
t = βEtπw
t+1 − γwβπt + γwβπt−1 +
1
(1 + β)




⎝ ζnt − wt
+ 1




wt = wt−1 + πw,t − πt (20)
rt − Etπt+1 =
1
1 − b
(Etct+1 − (1 − b)ct + bct−1) (21)
rt = ρrrt−1 +( 1− ρr)(φy∆yt + φππt) (22)
A.6 Stationary equilibrium of the model
In this section, we present the stationary equilibrium of our model. To induce stationarity,
we divide consumption, output, real wage by the level of the permanent supply shock At.
We denote transformed variables consumption and real wages by e Ct = Ct
At and f Wt = Wt
PtAt.
Furthermore, we label log-deviations of a stationary variable e Xt from its steady-state
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e wt = e wt−1 + πw,t − πt − ∆at (25)
rt − Etπt+1 =
1
1 − b
(Ete ct+1 − (1 − b)e ct + be ct−1 − b∆at) (26)
rt = ρrrt−1 +( 1− ρr)(φy (∆e ct − ∆at) − +φππt) (27)
Note that due to market clearing e ct = e yt.
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30Figure 1 - COLA coverage, correlation wage-price inflation and inflation variability
Note: COLA = cost-of-living adjustment clauses included in major collective bargaining agreements (i.e. contracts covering
         more than 1,000 workers). Figures refer to end of preceding year. Source: Hendricks and Kahn (1985), Weiner (1986)
         and Bureau of Labor Statistics. The observation for 1956 is interpolated, and the series has been discontinued in 1996.
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COLA coverage (left axis)
Correlation wage-price inflation (right axis)
Stdv. price inflation (right axis)Figure 2 - Impact lagged price inflation on wage inflation
Note: Figures are time-varying medians of the posterior distribution together with 16th and 84th percentiles, and













1955Q1 1965Q1 1975Q1 1985Q1 1995Q1 2005Q1Figure 3 - Time-varying impulse response functions to a technology shock
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Note: black dotted lines are estimated median impulse responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles for respectively 1974Q1 and 2000Q1. Responses normalized to have a 1 percent long-run impact on output.
          Full red lines are DSGE impulse responses for a permanent technology shock
ESTIMATED IMPULSE RESPONSES 1974Q1
Rule with strong reaction to inflation
ESTIMATED IMPULSE RESPONSES 2000Q1
wage indexation wage indexation
Policy rule with strong reaction to inflation
no wage indexation wage indexation no wage indexation



































































































































































































0 4 8 12 16 20